I. INTRODUCTION
Damages litigation has always played a major role in the development of United States antitrust law, making, in the words of Judge Ginsburg, "private litigants the primary enforcers of antitrust rules". 2 In contrast, in the EU, and according to the Commission, "in practice most victims, particularly SMEs and consumers, rarely obtain compensation" in the field of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 3 Damages claims for breaches of the EU State Aid Rules are Even Rarer. While the assessment of the compatibility of the aid with the internal market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, 4 it is for national courts to safeguard the rights of individuals against potential breaches of State aid rules. 5 To this end, the legal order of each Member State may provide for a variety of remedies aimed at the enforcement of State aid rules, including recovery of unlawful aid, recovery of interest, damages for competitors and other third parties, and interim measures against unlawful aid.
6 This article analyses, (i) the general principle of EU law on effectiveness and a number of potential implications for antitrust and (ii) a number of "lessons" for State Aid litigation deriving from the domain of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 2 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg of EU State Aid law and, more precisely, to breaches of the standstill obligation in Article 108(3) TFEU.
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The right to damages under EU State Aid law and the right to damages under EU antitrust law thus have a common origin: they both derive from the general principle of effectiveness of EU law and from the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 CFREU. This justifies a certain degree of cross-fertilization between antitrust damages claims and damages claims for State Aid law, a point to which we will turn to in the following subsection. Moreover, both antitrust and State Aid claims will need to comply from the requirements deriving from the general principle of effectiveness of EU law and of Article 47 CFREU. These include rules as regards, e.g., the duty, under certain circumstance, of national courts to raise EU law on their own motion, 14 locus standi before national courts, 15 etc.
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The CJEU has repeatedly indicated that, in the absence of EU rules governing the enforcement of EU rights (such as, in the domain of antitrust, Regulation 1/2003), 17 it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the rules governing the exercise of these rights. 18 However, the CJEU has also held that Member States are under EU law obligations when laying down the applicable rules for the enforcement of EU rights. The limits to national procedural rules in this context are the following:
• First, under the so-called "principle of equivalence", the rules governing the enforcement of Community rights cannot be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions. The CJEU has clarified that the question of whether a domestic measure is equivalent to an EU measure should be solved analysing the purpose and essential 13 
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The effects of the principle of effectiveness on domestic rules can be both negative and positive. The negative effect is that Member States' authorities, and thus also national judges, cannot apply domestic rules to the extent that they are incompatible with the principle of effectiveness. The positive effect means that Member States are under an active EU law obligation to apply the rules in such a way that they make the exercise of EU rights practically possible and not excessively difficult. This EU law obligation exists regardless on whether or not there are domestic rules governing the matter. 
III. POTENTIAL LESSONS FOR STATE AID LITIGATION FROM ANTITRUST DAMAGES CLAIMS
However, according to the Commission "in practice most victims, particularly SMEs and consumers, rarely obtain compensation". 23 The right to compensation is an EU right. However, and as indicated in the preceding subsection, pursuant to the general rules on the enforcement of EU rights, its exercise is governed by national rules, with the limits to the operation of these rules deriving from the general principle of EU law of effectiveness and Article 47 CFREU. According to the Commission, these national rules often make it costly and difficult to bring antitrust damages actions. 24 In order to overcome these obstacles, the Commission proposed Directive 2014/104/EU on Antitrust Damages Actions, which was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 26 November 2014, (the "Directive"), to remove the main obstacles to effective compensation, and to guarantee 25 
"a more level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market and to improve the conditions for consumers to exercise the rights they derive from the internal market […] to increase legal certainty and to reduce the differences between the Member States as to the national rules governing actions for damages for [competition law infringements]".
26 This is a very ambitious objective, given the mixture of common and civil law systems in the EU Member States.
The deadline for transposition of the Directive expired on 27 December 2016. 27 However, as of 14 June 2017, only 17 Member States have done so. These would be the following: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. On 24 January 2017, the Commission addressed letters of formal notice to all Member States which failed to communicate full transposition by 18 January 2017.
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Under EU law's prohibition of the so-called "horizontal" direct effect, a non-transposed directive cannot be directly applicable to damages claims 23 See, e.g., http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html. 24 See, e.g., http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html. 25 
The introduction of disclosure of certain documents
The Directive notes that "competition law litigation is characterised by information asymmetry" since "the evidence necessary to prove a claim for damages is often held exclusively by the opposing party", 32 or third persons, and are often not known to claimants in sufficient detail. As a result, the extent to which a claimant can require disclosure (roughly speaking, the equivalent to "discovery" under US procedural law) of relevant documents from a defendant will be of paramount importance to prevail in damages litigation. Disclosure is important for establishing liability, in a standalone action, causation and quantum, in both follow-on and standalone actions. Diverging national regulations as regards disclosure have been a crucial factor in the popularity of certain EU Member States, in particular the UK, with claimants seeking to bring damages actions for infringements of Competition law in jurisdictions providing for more generous disclosure regimes.
Consequently, the Directive establishes that Member States' national courts must be able to order a defendant or a third party, including public authorities, to disclose relevant documents required by the claimants who 29 present "a reasoned justification" as to "the plausibility of its claim". 33 This change will constitute in practice a significant modification for many Member States' evidentiary regimes, since many, including (pre-Directive) France and Spain had little or no general obligation placed upon the defendant, save in respect of those documents in which the defendant directly relies.
Under the disclosure rules provided for by the Directive:
• Disclosure is limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality in the light of the legitimate interests of all parties concerned, the scope and cost of disclosure, especially for third parties, and whether the evidence for which disclosure is sought contains confidential information.
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• National courts must also be able to order the disclosure of "categories" of evidence. 35 The rationale for this rule is that it will not always be possible for a claimant to know in advance precisely which relevant documents the defendant has in his control.
36
• Disclosure orders can include, under certain circumstances, evidence in the file of a competition authority. 37 Were a similar provision adopted in the domain of state aid, this could help plaintiffs establish that aid has not been notified to the Commission 38 or, for those EU Member States whose National Competition Authorities have the power to issue reports in matters related to State Aid, to the proceedings prior to the publication (or decision not to publish) such reports.
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• Disclosure orders can encompass confidential information relevant for damage claims. However, the Directive also orders Member States to 33 See Directive, at Article 5(1). 34 See Directive, at Recital 16. 35 See Directive, at Article 5(2). 36 See Directive, Recital 15. 37 See Directive, at Article 6(1). 38 In State aid proceedings, interested parties (let alone third parties in general) have no right to be informed whether the Commission is investigating the alleged aid during the preliminary examination phase. In the same vein, interested parties do not have the right to know whether a complaint has been made or whether the aid has been notified. It is noted, however, that the grant of aid may breach the so-called standstill obligation not only in cases where the aid was not notified at all, but also in cases where the authority implemented the aid before getting the Commission's approval. Therefore, to the extent that there is no formal Commission decision on the alleged aid measure, affected third parties interested in bringing damages claims before national courts might want to do so even without knowing for sure whether the aid in question has been notified or not. 39 This would be the case, e.g., of the Spanish "Comisión Nacional de Mercados y de la Competencia", see Act 15/2007, of 3 July, on the Defence of Competition, at Article 11. have "effective measures to protect such information". 40 In addition, the Directive also indicates that "full effect" is to be given to legal professional privilege. 41 State aid damages litigation would benefit from the EU adopting an instrument facilitating disclosure in the manner specified above. This can be relevant in relation to the disclosure of evidence by the entity granting the aid but, crucially, also from the entities that received the aid and which might be competing with the plaintiff.
Limitation periods
In the past, the Commission had expressed the view that the existence of different national limitation periods across the EU Member States constituted an obstacle to the effective recovery of damages.
42 Pre-Directive, in Germany, the time limit to institute proceedings was three years from the end of the year in which the right to claim damages arises and in which the claimant has knowledge of both the circumstances underlying the claim and the identity of the defendant (or does not know of them through gross negligence). 43 Under the Directive, limitation periods within which an antitrust damages action must be brought will remain a matter for national law. Those rules shall determine: (i) when the limitation period begins to run; (ii) the duration thereof; and (iii) the circumstances under which the limitation period is interrupted or suspended. 44 However, Article 10 of the Directive introduces minimum requirements which must be reflected in national laws of all EU Member States. These are the following:
• Limitation periods for bringing actions for damages shall be at least five years.
45
• Limitation periods shall be suspended if a competition authority takes action in relation to " Directive, limitation periods must also be suspended during any consensual dispute resolution negotiations.
• Limitation periods will not begin to run before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or "can be reasonably expected to know":
a. Of the behaviour and the fat that it constitutes an infringement of Competition law; b. Of the fact that the infringement of Competition law caused harm to it; and c. The identity of the infringer.
The Directive will simplify the position by harmonising the point in time at which time starts to run in all Member States, and requiring limitation periods to be no less than five years from that point. However, there will still be scope for differences between Member States as the five-year period is only a minimum requirement. For example, after the entry into force of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in the UK on 1 October 2015, limitation periods before the UK courts and the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CAT") in respect of antitrust damages claims will both be set at six years from the date on which the cause of action occurred (subject to postponement where the infringement has been concealed from the claimant), i.e., longer than the minimum length required by the Directive. Moreover, the partial simplification of the position will also come at a cost for defendants: the requirements of the Directive are likely to lead to longer limitation periods than is currently the case in most, if not all, EU Member States, and an increased risk for businesses that antitrust damages could be brought many years after the infringement has ceased.
Quantification of harm
Pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Directive, an in accordance to the general principle of effectiveness of EU law, national courts should be empowered to estimate the amount of the harm, "if it is established that a claimant suffered harm but it is practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the harm suffered on the basis of the evidence available". Even without an instrument similar to the Directive in the domain of State Aid, a similar rule, deriving from the general principle of effectiveness of EU law, is likely to apply to State Aid damages claims. I.e., national procedural rules on the enforcement of rights deriving from Article 108(3) TFEU should not make the exercise of these rights impossible or excessively difficult. Moreover, the following rules on quantification, deriving from the general principle 382 12 of effectiveness of EU law, are likely to apply to both State Aid and antitrust damage claims:
• National measures which cap compensation at very low levels 47 or those which provide for only nominal compensation with no regard to the damage sustained 48 are prohibited by EU law.
• Similarly, Member States are not allowed to preclude compensation for certain types of damage, notably economic loss. 49 At Article 17(2), the Directive establishes a rebuttable presumption that cartel infringements cause harm. We are unaware of literature studying the empirical damages resulting from unlawful State aid, but this is a field where the Commission might want to consider commissioning an study similar to the one it has requested from an economic consultancy on passing on effects. 50 Under the case-law on effectiveness of EU law, parties injured by an infringement of directly effective EU rules (thus including Articles 101 and 102 TFEU but also 108(3) TFEU in the domain of State Aid) should therefore have the full real value of their losses restored: the entitlement to full compensation covers the actual loss (damnum emergens), as well as compensation for loss of profit (lucrum cessans) suffered as a result of the infringement; 51 and entitlement to interest from the time the damage occurred.
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Further complementary measures are the Commission Communication and Practical Guide on quantifying antitrust harm in damages actions. 53 These documents aim to help national courts and parties to antitrust damages 383 13 actions in the often complex task of quantifying damages. The Practical Guide provides an overview of the main economic methods, techniques and empirical insights available to quantify damages in practice. Though they are expressly limited to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, some of the methods suggested there (comparison over time on the same market, comparison with data from other geographic and product markets, etc.) can also be useful in the context of State Aid.
Additional quantification guidance will be provided by the Commission in the form of Guidelines for national courts on the passing-on of overcharges. The Commission is assisted in drafting the Guidelines by a Study on the Passing-on of Overcharges. 54 Drawing on relevant economic theory and quantitative methods, as well as relevant legal practice and rules, the study provides judges, legal practitioners and parties to antitrust damages actions with a practical framework for assessing and quantifying passing-on effects.
The Directive introduced other new rules in relation to antitrust damages litigation which do not strike us as particularly relevant for State Aid enforcement. For example, Article 11 of the Directive provides that, under certain circumstances, a person who has suffered harm as a result of a Competition law infringement should be able to claim compensation for the entire harm, suffered from any of the co-infringers. There might be instances where the aid has been unlawfully granted by more than one entity. However, these scenarios are less likely to be as prominent within State Aid law as collective infringements are in the domain of Antitrust, particularly when it comes to Article 101 TFEU, a provision which, by definition, is only breached by a plurality of entities acting collectively.
Moreover, the Directive does not deal with every aspect of antitrust damage actions, let alone for those which might be relevant for State Aid damages enforcement. However, the Directive recalls at Recital 11 the fact that national procedural rules not subject to the Directive are nonetheless governed by rules deriving from the general principle of effectiveness of EU law we set out in the preceding Section. Crucially, the Directive notes that this covers rules on causation of harm, which must also observe the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. This means, the Directive indicates, that rules on causation "should not be formulated or applied in a way that makes it excessively difficult or practicable impossible to exercise the right to compensation guaranteed by the TFEU". We see little reason not to extend this rule to causation relationships in State Aid damages litigation.
Relevant topics not dealt with by the Directive include:
1. Jurisdiction over and enforcement of damages claims. These points will continue to be governed by the so-called "Brussels II measure to the Damages Directive is thus the Commission Recommendation on collective redress (the "Recommendation"), which invited Member States to introduce by 26 July 2015 collective redress mechanisms, including actions for damages. 58 The Commission has announced it will assess the Recommendation's implementation and, if appropriate, propose further measures by 26 July 2017 but, as of 16 July 2017, it has not done so. Recommendations are not directly applicable but, according to the case-law of the CJEU, they can have indirect / Marleasing effect. 59 Critics of the US class action regime argue that plaintiff law firms leverage the significant risks class actions create to defendants to extract large settlements from them, regardless of the merits of their claims. 3. The availability of interim injunctions in standalone damages actions.
It is likely that the availability of these actions, both for antitrust litigation and for damages litigation, will be governed by the Factortame case-law, 60 again, under the general principle of effectiveness of EU law. Apart from the above legislation and complementary measures, the Commission is committed to providing assistance to national courts in the application of the Competition provisions in the TFEU. This includes a funding programme for training of national judges in EU competition law and judicial cooperation between national judges, including in relation to State Aid law. 61 
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its strongly centralised character, the system of State Aid control partially relies on damages enforcement. The evidence indicates, however, that damage plaintiffs have failed to make full use of these opportunities. This was the main conclusion of the Study on the enforcement of State Aid law conducted at the request of the Commission on 2006, 62 with commentators generally noting that State Aid damages enforcement has not generally taken off. 63 Another study carried out in 2009 noted a certain increase the ne number of State Aid cases brought before national courts, although the numbers were still low in relation to antitrust damages claims.
Enhanced State Aid damages litigation would further the effectiveness of the EU State Aid rules. Such enhanced State Aid enforcement is being jeopardised by the following issues: 64 
